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Environmental Policy in the United Kingdom and Germany 
CHARLES LEES 
 
 
 
The chapter examines developments within environmental policy making in the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany and asks: (i) can we identify patterns of 
convergence and/or divergence between the two countries?; and (ii) to what extent does 
the European integration process impact upon these patterns? It uses an historical 
institutionalist framework within which to frame the analysis. 
 
 
Introduction 
This study examines developments within environmental policy making in the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany and is examined along three dimensions: 
(i) the historical context; (ii) policy instruments and discourses; and (iii) policy outcomes. 
In empirical terms, it asks: (i) can we identify patterns of convergence and/or divergence 
along these three dimensions between the two countries?; and (ii) to what extent does the 
European integration process impact upon these patterns? The second question is 
particularly useful in a comparative context because it also serves to enhance our 
understanding of the scope and scale of the processes of Europeanization and policy 
transfer within the United Kingdom, Germany and, by inference, further afield. In 
2 
theoretical terms it uses an historical institutionalist framework within which to frame the 
analysis. 
The historical institutionalist approach is useful because it provides a macro-level 
theoretical lens within which it is possible to both embed and problematize the meso-
level concepts of ‘Europeanization’ and ‘policy transfer’. The mechanics of these two 
concepts are expanded upon elsewhere in this volume. However, let us clarify the study’s 
use of the concept of Europeanization at this point. There is a lively debate within the 
literature as to whether Europeanization is a ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ process and this 
debate also touches on the role of intervening variables (nation-specific norms, standard 
operating procedures) in the process
1
. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage with 
these debates. It is, however, useful to point out that although reference is made to a 
bottom-up conception of Europeanization – for instance, with regard to the uploading to 
the European Union level of German regulatory practices in the 1980s - the study gives 
more weight to a top-down conception of the process. There are two reasons for this. 
First, because the top-down approach explicitly places member states as the ‘receivers’ of 
Europeanization, it provides a better framework for concentrating on a comparison of 
policy practices in the United Kingdom and Germany. Second, the top-down approach 
complements the historical institutionalist framework in that it requires some degree of 
institutional ‘misfit’ at the member state level to exert the adaptational pressures for 
Europeanization to occur. Again, this allows us to concentrate upon institutional settings 
in the United Kingdom and Germany. At the same time, however, the study is responsive 
to criticisms of the top-down approach found in the literature
2
 and places significant 
weight on intervening variables that determine the scope and scale of Europeanization. 
3 
This emphasis on intervening variables in the process of Europeanization ties in with 
debates surrounding the nature of policy transfer
3
 and the more recent and less-developed 
idea of ‘policy resistance’4. But in order to engage with these concepts, the study first sets 
out the historical context of environmental policy making in the United Kingdom and 
Germany. 
 
 
The historical context 
Environmental policy is a paradigmatic example of a ‘trans-boundary’ policy domain. Be 
it degradation of wetlands, rivers, and other water resources, or air pollution and global 
warming, many environmental problems are not - and cannot - be confined within 
national borders. It is no surprise, therefore, that there is a tension between the trans-
boundary nature of such problems and the dominant mode of governance, which remains 
based around the institutions of the nation state
5
. 
It is a given in the historical institutionalist literature
6
 that when institutions are in 
equilibrium they are characterised by the phenomenon of ‘path dependence’. The day-to-
day operation of path dependant institutions is shaped by established norms and standard 
operating procedures, many of which were laid down at a very early stage in these 
institutions’ history. Any institutional change or development that takes place in this 
context is incremental. Path dependence is not a universal phenomenon, however, and 
institutions can also evolve through a series of ‘punctuated equilibria’, in which ‘rapid 
bursts of change (are) followed by long periods of stasis’7. Throughout this process, 
however, the policy choices made and standard operating procedures established around 
4 
the time of institutional formation shape the scope and scale of subsequent developments. 
Sometimes, as with the abandonment of Keynesian economic policy in the United 
Kingdom after 1976, certain institutions are able to leap free of the shackles of prior 
practice and achieve what amounts to a ‘paradigm shift’ in the substance of policy 
making
8
. In most cases, however, we see a more prosaic process in which standard 
operating procedures often inhibit anything more than incremental change. This leads to 
two possible ideal types of outcome. In one, successful institutions are able to work with 
the grain of existing procedures, build upon past successes and enhance existing 
institutional capacity. In the other, poorly performing institutions are unable to achieve a 
paradigm shift and the subsequent inability to successfully adapt can then lead to further 
institutional underperformance and policy failure. Most institutions, of course, fall 
between these two ideal types but, where failure is clearly evident, the ability of 
institutions to break the cycle is dependant on the configuration of policy goals and 
discourses within them – and the more contingent phenomenon of whether key 
institutional agents are able or willing to do so. This is looked in more depth later in the 
article. 
So where does this leave the development of environmental policy in the United 
Kingdom and Germany? The historical institutionalist approach requires that current 
practices in a given policy area are best explained through a reasonably detailed analysis 
of its development over time. And as we shall see, such an analysis of the institutional 
development and performance of environmental policy making in the two countries 
clearly demonstrates (i) significant variance in institutional performance between the two 
countries; (ii) the persistence of standard operating procedures in both countries; but also 
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indicates (iii) a capacity for learning and adaptation
9
. Nevertheless, and despite the 
activist role assumed by the European Union within the policy domain, we can identify 
nation-specific standard operating procedures that persist to the present day. So, let us 
look at the historical development of each country in turn, before examining the role of 
the European Union. 
 
The United Kingdom context 
In the United Kingdom it is possible to identify the emergence of an environmental 
policy domain from the early 19
th
 Century onwards, thus making it the first industrial 
democracy in which an identifiable environmental policy domain was to develop. As the 
first country to industrialize, the United Kingdom underwent a process of political-
economic, demographic, and physical change that was unprecedented in human history. 
This process was particularly notable in England and Wales, where industrialization 
prompted huge levels of both population growth and population transfer. Thus, in the 100 
years from the early 19
th
 to early 20
th
 Centuries, the population of England and Wales 
grew from 8.9 million to 32.5 million and, in the first 50 years of the 19
th
 Century, over 4 
million people migrated to towns and cities. As a result, by the mid 19
th
 Century, over 50 
per cent of the population lived in urban areas
10
. The resulting urban squalor prompted a 
number of environmental reforms, albeit embedded within a wider policy concern for 
public health, physical and sometimes even moral, improvement, rather than one 
explicitly predicated on the idea of environmental sustainability. Given that Victorian 
Britain was the exemplar of a strong unitary state, the standard operating procedures 
established at this time were consistent with a pattern in which a strong central 
6 
government took limited measures to empower sub-national levels of government in 
order to impose what were intended to be broadly uniform (albeit pragmatic and 
minimalist) standards prescribed by the centre. 
As environmental concerns where contingent on the wider set of concerns noted 
above, it is to be expected that early initiatives were either (i) focused on relatively 
narrow policy problems; or (ii) nested in legislation that was primarily focused on other – 
albeit related – policy concerns. Early examples of the former focused on, for instance, 
hydrogen chloride emissions from alkali works, starting with the 1863 Alkali Act and 
followed by a number of associated pieces of legislation in the latter half of the 19
th
 
Century. By contrast, a more holistic approach to tackling environmental issues could be 
found in the wider public health policy domain, as well as in private philanthropic 
initiatives associated with it. Government initiatives of this kind included legislation 
prompted by the 1840 Select Committee on the Health of Towns and the 1845 Royal 
Commission on the State of Large Towns, such as the 1848 Public Health Act, the 1851 
Shaftesbury Act, the 1868 Torrens Act, and the 1875 Cross Act. Private initiatives were 
predicated on the perceived link between living conditions and labour productivity and 
focused on the creation of new model towns such as Birmingham’s Bournville - created 
by the local Cadbury family – and similar creations elsewhere such as Port Sunlight in 
the Wirral, and Saltaire near Bradford. 
By the end of the 19
th
 Century we can identify an emerging set of policy 
discourses and associated norms, buttressed by an institutional architecture and array of 
standard operating procedures that were to persist into the last decades of the 20
th
 
Century and, arguably, were only first seriously challenged under the impact of the Aquis 
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Communataire. In terms of discourses and norms, we can identify the persistence of a 
highly empirical problem-solving approach to environmental issues. This manifested 
itself in two ways. First, in as far as we can identify a stand-alone domain of 
environmental policy, United Kingdom environmental initiatives eschewed the explicit 
incorporation of abstract concepts such as the German norm of Stand der Technik (‘Best 
Available Technology’) as a priori requirements within the policy discourse in favour of 
focusing on specific problems as and when they emerged and/or were identified as such. 
This ‘tactical rather than strategic’ style of policy-making11 can be seen in the Alkali Act 
noted above, but was still identifiable a century later in the 1956 Clean Air Act. The Act, 
which sought to control industrial and domestic emissions in specific urban areas, was 
enacted in response to the ‘Great Smog’ of December 1952, which is estimated to have 
killed around 4,000 Londoners
12
. To be sure, the Clean Air Act was effective in tackling 
the specificities of the smog problem of the 1950s, but it was enacted before the 
exponential growth of automobile ownership that was to take place in the 1960s and 
1970s. Thus, it was an effective ‘fire-fighting’ measure at the time and brought about 
long-term improvements. But its failure to enshrine abstract policy principles meant that 
it was of little use in tackling subsequent emissions problems associated with increased 
car use. Having said that, however, it would be wrong to over-exaggerate the legacy of 
British empiricism and we can see the development of a number of implicit abstract 
principles that would continue to underpin environmental legislation. Thus, as Bell
13
 
points out, in order to be effective, the 1874 Alakali Act effectively introduced the ‘Best 
Practical Means’ principle that has become accepted as a distinctive underlying 
8 
component of United Kingdom environmental legislation. Best Practical Means and other 
standard setting philosophies are returned to later in this study. 
The second manifestation of this empiricist approach was the ongoing practice, 
discussed above, of nesting environmental measures within a wider and/or cross-cutting 
policy agenda. Examples of this include the 1909 Housing, Town Planning etc Act, 
which granted powers to sub-national tiers of government to regulate suburban growth, 
and the 1919 Housing and Town Planning Act, which widened the policy remit 
established in the 1909 Act, the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, which further 
extended the policy remit to include the planning of green spaces, reservoirs, security of 
water supply and sewage disposal, and the 1949 National Parks and Access to the 
Countryside Act, which established national parks in England and Wales and designated 
a number of Areas of Natural Beauty. 
As noted above, these policy discourses and associated norms were buttressed by 
an institutional architecture and set of standard operating procedures that persisted well 
into the late 20
th
 Century. As Carter and Lowe observe, ‘government structures … 
relating to environmental protection have been (and largely remain) an accretion of 
agencies, procedures and policies’14. The key institutional features have historically been 
those of fragmentation and the apparently arbitrary division of policy competences across 
ministries, quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (Quangos) and associated 
agencies. Thus, as Baldock observed in the 1980s, England was the only nation that had 
sought to make the kind of distinction between policy competences seen in the roles of 
the Countryside Commission (responsible for landscape preservation) and English 
Nature (responsible for nature conservation)
15
. 
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Apparently nonsensical divisions of competences within policy domains are not 
limited to the United Kingdom’s management of environmental policy, of course. Yet 
one cannot escape the sense that this persistent institutional pathology undermines the 
advantages associated with the feature that has traditionally defined the United 
Kingdom’s structure of government – the strong unitary state. A discussion of the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of unitary and federal states is beyond the scope of this study, 
but even the most enthusiastic federalist would not deny that one potential advantage of 
the unitary state structure is its steering capacity and relative lack of veto players. 
However, when - as was the case in 1969 – up to ten separate ministries were involved in 
United Kingdom environmental policy making
16
, we cannot escape the conclusion that 
this one specific advantage over federal states such as Germany was effectively being 
squandered. And this was recognised by policy makers, who in 1970 unified many of the 
previously disparate policy competences within the newly-created Department of 
Environment. The remit and title of the Department has changed over the years with 
successive governments but, at the time of writing (May 2006), the Ministry of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs portfolio is a cabinet post and is occupied by David 
Milliband. 
Amongst the Department’s responsibilities at present are the management of the 
Environment Agency and, from October 2006, a new unified Quango (made up of 
English Nature and the Countryside Commission) called Natural England. But this 
gradual consolidation of competences over time has, however, been matched by an 
additional degree of fragmentation associated with the process of Devolution and 
constitutional change following Labour’s 1997 General Election victory. Thus, in 
10 
Scotland, the Scottish Executive manages environmental policy and there is a separate 
Environment Protection Agency. In Wales there is a Minister for Environment, Planning, 
and Countryside. But in Northern Ireland the suspension of devolved government means 
that environmental policy is still effectively being run from London. 
 
The German context 
The institutional development of German environmental policy is at least as path-
dependant as that of the United Kingdom, although the emergence of a distinct 
environmental policy domain did not take place until later in the 19
th
 Century. As noted 
earlier, the pattern established in the United Kingdom was one in which a strong central 
government passed legislation intended to both impose standards across the territory of 
the unitary state and empower sub-national levels of government to work within 
prescribed parameters in order to further these goals. By contrast, and in keeping with the 
kind of standard operating procedures associated with federal states, the first institutional 
feature of note in Germany was that of independent Land involvement, dating back to 
local ordinances such as the Prussian Gewerbeordnungen. 
 In the late 19
th
 Century, the newly united Germany was engaged in a process of 
economic and military catch-up with the United Kingdom; and in such an atmosphere of 
national competition, industrial growth and the wider social welfare were considered to 
be coterminous
17
. As a result, legislation was limited in scope and focused on individual 
emissions. Air pollution control authorities issued ‘technical instructions’ (Technische 
Anleitungen) to individual emitters and, from 1895 onwards, these technical instructions 
enforced corrective measures commensurate with standards of Best Available 
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Technology. The early establishment of Best Available Technology standards is 
consistent with the German tradition of formulating public policy within the parameters 
established by abstract principles. And, as we shall see, the focus on individual emitters 
and the use of Best Available Technology standards are operating procedures that persist 
today and were uploaded to the European Union level. Individual Land responsibility for 
pollution control was less appropriate for the management of wetlands and waterways, in 
which it is notoriously difficult to establish responsibility for individual acts of pollution 
and enforce subsequent measures against emitters
18
. In response to this problem of 
institutional misfit, Land governments set up a number of partnership agreements 
(Genossenschaften) to manage pollution problems affecting adjacent Länder on, for 
instance, the Rhine, Wuppe, Lippe and Ruhr rivers
19
. Nevertheless, established standard 
operating procedures remained embedded in wider practices of horizontal co-operation 
between sub-national tiers of government. 
These practices were so well-embedded that, by the end of the 1950s, there was 
still no meaningful role for the Federal level of government and most of the regulatory 
devices in use had been in place since the start of the Great War. But under pressure from 
a range of societal actors, the Federal level began to involve itself. Initial Federal 
legislation, such as the Water Household Act of 1957 and the Clean Air Maintenance 
Law of 1959, was limited in scope and ambition but the Federal government slowly 
began to assume a more activist role. Building on a template established in the SPD-run 
state of North Rhine-Westphalia
20
, the Federal government issued its own TAs and set 
out air quality standards for dust, chlorine, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and 
hydrogen sulphide, which were coupled to Best Available Technology requirements. The 
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establishment of the SPD-FDP coalition in 1969 increased the impetus for Federal 
involvement and it was at this point that Germany began to undergo a phase of ‘activist 
policy design’21 that was close to the idea of a paradigm shift discussed earlier in this 
study. The Brandt government framed its new environmental policy program around 
existing Best Available Technology standards, but also encouraged the codification of 
three normative principles - the ‘Precautionary’ Principle, the ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle 
and the ‘Co-operation’ Principle – that were also subsequently to be uploaded to the 
European Union level. These three abstractions informed a raft of new legislation, 
including the Air Traffic Noise Act (1971), the Leaded Petrol Act (1972), the Waste 
Disposal Act (1972), the DDT Act (1972), the Federal Air Quality Protection Act (1974), 
and the (1974) Technical Instruction for the Maintenance of Air Purity
22
. In addition, the 
Federal Agency for the Environment (Umweltbundesamt) was set up in 1974. The agency 
became an effective enforcer of environmental standards and diffuser of best practice. 
However, it was and remained essentially a technocratic institution and it would be 
another 12 years before a fully-fledged Environment Ministry was established in the 
wake of the Chernobyl disaster
23
 – 16 years later than its British equivalent. 
The economic crises of the mid-to-late 1970s led to a shift in government 
priorities and, as a result, the environmental agenda was temporarily eclipsed by what 
appeared to be the more pressing needs of economic retrenchment. However, the late 
1970s and early 1980s saw a revival of environmental interest amongst the political class 
and the beginning of a period of cross-party consensus on the need for an activist policy 
agenda. Subsequent initiatives included the 1982 Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants 
(Grossfeurungsanlagenverordnung), the 1983 Air Pollution Control Law in July 1983 - 
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that became the model for the subsequent European Communities Directive on Large 
Combustion Plants – the setting up in 1986 of the Federal Ministry for Environment, 
Nature Protection and Reactor Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit) and the 1987 Commission of Enquiry on Preventative Measures to 
Protect the Earth’s Atmosphere (Enquete-Kommission Vorsage zum Schutz der 
Erdatmosphäre).  
By the mid-1990s, however, Germany’s leadership role in the field of 
environmental policy had come under pressure on three fronts. First, the economic costs 
of managing the process of German unification had led to a resurgence of worries about 
German economic competitiveness amongst elites and had served to erode what had 
effectively been a decade-long cross party consensus on environmental policy. This 
manifested itself both within the Bundestag and, with the accession of five relatively poor 
eastern states, in the Bundesrat. Second, and in response to the economic pressures noted 
above, the preferences of an enlarged and more socially diverse electorate had shifted 
away from post-materialist concerns such as environmental protection back towards 
materialist concerns such as job creation and economic growth. This further constrained 
the scope of environmental policy innovation elites were prepared to endorse and 
increased the opportunities for partisan conflict over the issue. Third, not only did the 
relative lack of domestic consensus on environmental protection at both the elite and 
mass levels make it harder to articulate German interests in the environmental policy 
domain at the European Union level, but Germany’s ongoing economic difficulties also 
made it harder to pursue these interests through the use of side-payments to other 
member states
24
. Nevertheless, if taken in the round, the Federal Republic today still 
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retains an enviable record in most areas of environmental policy – despite its lower 
profile compared with the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
The impact of the European Union 
From the 1980s onwards the development of environmental policy making in both the 
United Kingdom and Germany took place within the context of an increasingly assertive 
European Union level policy agenda. But, although there was a common impact on both 
countries, the effects of this impact were somewhat different. In other words, as in other 
policy areas, the scope and scale of the Europeanization of environmental policy making 
was partly dependant on the level of institutional misfit
25
 between the two member states 
and the European Union. This level of misfit can be conceived as taking place along three 
dimensions. 
The first dimension relates to established standard operating procedures directly 
associated with the policy domain. Although the dichotomy between environmental 
‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ is problematized in the literature26, it is clear that those member 
states that were perceived (or perceived themselves) to be leaders in this regard sought to 
impose standards as close as possible to their own upon other member states through the 
medium of the European Union. As a result, at least in the initial period of 
Europeanization, the adaptive pressures exerted on the United Kingdom (as a perceived 
‘laggard’) were stronger than those felt by Germany (widely regarded at the time as a 
‘leader’). Before the 1980s, environmental policy was originally very much a 
‘Cinderella’ policy area at the European level and in as far as environmental concerns had 
any leverage it was as a tangential element to stated Community objectives such as those 
15 
embodied in European Economic Community Treaty Articles 2 (quality of life, 
harmonious economic development, balanced expansion), 100 (dismantling barriers to 
the Common Market) and 235 (allowing Council of Ministers to take action in areas not 
covered by treaties). From 1973 onwards, the European Community also issued 
Environmental Action Plans, but it was the Single European Act and the Maastricht 
Treaty that enabled the European Union to carve out a distinct set of Environmental 
policy objectives and principles. 
During the 1980s in particular, a ‘German’ regulatory culture was uploaded to the 
European level and subsequent legislation was thus predicated on the precautionary, 
Polluter Pays, and Best Available Technology principles. These abstractions were 
absorbed and adapted by British policy makers but, nevertheless, the 1980s saw a number 
of instances in which the United Kingdom came under both horizontal pressure from 
other ‘leader’ states and vertical pressure from the European Union level. This led to the 
United Kingdom using its veto, for instance with regard to a planned European 
Communities Directive on Vehicle Emissions and a later proposal to adopt a common 
carbon dioxide and energy tax. More recently, however, European Union environmental 
policy (in line with other policy domains) has moved towards a mix of economic 
instruments and so-called ‘soft law’27 that is closer to United Kingdom practices and 
preferences. By contrast, the increasing emphasis on soft law approaches served to 
restrict the ability to upload German environmental practices up to the European Union 
level and, at the same time, Germany itself has come under increasing pressure to adapt 
its own standard operating procedures. In particular, Germany’s reluctance to embrace 
16 
economic instruments has been criticised
28
. This is discussed at greater length later in the 
study. 
 The second dimension of misfit related to the wider governance structures in the 
two states. At the European Union level, the institutional architecture of environmental 
policy is very close to the kind of multi-level governance ideal-types posited in the 
literature
29
. Thus, the Single European Act in particular provided the impetus for the 
European Commission to take an active role, yet we find a clear fragmentation of 
competences between the Environment, Industry, and Agriculture Directorates General. 
At the same time, the European Parliament has used this policy domain as a means with 
which to widen its policy scope, to the extent, as Weale observes, that the European 
Parliament enjoys ‘more influence...than...far more established national parliaments’30 in 
this area of policy making. Moreover, the European Court of Justice has often ruled in 
favour of the environmental lobby, for instance in the 1988 ‘Danish Bottle’ case, which 
led to a ruling that environmental protection may override the free movement of goods 
within the European Union. The European Union also has a European Environmental 
Agency – modelled on its German equivalent – which acts as a decentralized 
information-gathering and advisory body, often in concert with the Europe-wide 
‘European Information and Observation Network’. Finally, although environmental 
lobbying at the European Union level is relatively weak, the Commission has – as in 
other policy areas – sought to enhance its legitimacy by effectively by-passing national 
governments and dealing directly with societal actors at the sub-national level. 
 It is clear that the existence of multi-level governance dynamics generated at the 
European Union level has differential (and slightly paradoxical) effects on the two 
17 
member states. On the one hand, and as already noted, internal environmental policy 
making in the United Kingdom is distinguished by its incremental and fragmented nature. 
As a result, multi level governance dynamics are already commonplace in United 
Kingdom domestic policy making, albeit ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’31. At the same 
time, however, the United Kingdom still regards itself as a strong unitary actor in its 
interaction with the European Union level. As a result, where multi level dynamics have 
generated European Union level links with sub-national levels of governance, this was 
perceived as undermining the ‘gate keeper’ status of central government, and was not 
particularly welcomed. By contrast, the standard operating procedures associated with 
German federalism - such as bargaining and consensus-building at multiple levels of 
governance - meant that European Union level interventions did not present such a 
problem for ‘national’ policy makers who were less accustomed to the gate-keeper role 
enjoyed by their United Kingdom equivalents
32
. 
 The third dimension along which Europeanization exerted differential 
adaptational pressures was the simple one of political salience and its impact upon party 
political competition. As Wurzel observes, the framing of European Union environmental 
policy making within a ‘quality of life’ discourse has been used strategically ‘to increase 
the political legitimacy of the European Union, especially at times of high public 
environmental awareness’33. However, levels of public awareness, the salience it is 
accorded, the priority it is given over other concerns, and the means with which it is 
represented within party systems varies across member states. In Germany, for reasons 
that are beyond the scope of this study, public awareness is high, the issue is given 
relatively high salience and priority, and Germany’s ‘multi-member proportional’ 
18 
electoral system allows for the efficient representation of environmental issues, not least 
through the vehicle of the German Greens, who have been instrumental in bringing issues 
of environmental protection into the political mainstream
34
. By contrast, in the United 
Kingdom – and especially in the 1980s – public awareness was lower, prioritization was 
very low, and the ‘first-past-the-post’ plurality system prevented the effective 
representation of such issues by shutting out the Green Party, for instance
35
. At the time 
of writing, the use of environmentalism as a campaign issue by the Conservative Party 
has - temporarily at least – led to higher levels of public awareness, issue salience and 
prioritization, at least in terms of rhetoric. In addition, the introduction of proportional 
representation for European Parliament elections in the United Kingdom, combined with 
some success for the Greens in local elections in cities such as Brighton and Sheffield, 
has enhanced the representation of environmental issues within the party system. It 
remains to be seen if this is a long-term development, which would surely ease 
adaptational pressures on the United Kingdom, or if eventually the status quo ante will be 
restored. 
 
 
Policy instruments and discourses 
In this section we compare and contrast the ‘styles’ of environmental policy making in 
the United Kingdom and Germany, with an emphasis on the instruments used by policy 
makers and the types of policy discourses in which these instruments are selected and 
justified. Let us turn first to the use of policy instruments. 
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There are three broad categories of policy instrument. First, there are the classic 
command-and-control regulatory instruments. In addition, however, internationally we 
have seen the emergence in the last few decades of two additional types of so-called 
‘new’ environmental policy instruments. The first of these are voluntary agreements, 
ranging from informal methods (e.g. eco-labelling, encouraging re-cycling, and other life-
style changes) to more formal instruments such as the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO 14001), which provides environmental management system 
benchmarks. The second type of these new instruments are market-based instruments, 
which can be further divided into two categories: first, rights-based mechanisms, such as 
tradeable permits and quotas, and, second, ‘green’ or ‘eco’ taxes. 
 
Policy instruments and discourses in the United Kingdom 
As already noted, environmental policy making in the United Kingdom has traditionally 
been characterised by a piecemeal approach, in which a unitary state has overseen the 
activities of subordinate tiers of sub-national government, as well as a fragmented mosaic 
of national-level ministries, agencies, and quangos. The style of policy making has been 
embedded in the British tradition of empiricism and problem-solving and where abstract 
policy principles have existed, these have been as much implied as made explicit. Whilst 
all this is true, of course, it would be a mistake to over-state such nation-specific 
characteristics. Thus, whilst there are clear differences between national policy making 
styles and standard operating procedures, the reductio ad absurdum of such an analytical 
position. – of national policy styles that are effectively prisoners of path-dependence, 
with little or no capacity to learn or adapt – is not particularly helpful. As touched upon 
20 
earlier in this study, the environmental policy community in the United Kingdom has 
clearly learned and adapted in recent years. Let us now examine the mix of policy 
instruments and discourses that characterise United Kingdom environmental policy 
making today. 
As described in the previous section, the United Kingdom has a long history of 
environmental regulation, dating back to the mid-19
th
 Century. At the same time, 
however, although we often refer to regulatory instruments as ‘command-and-control’ 
measures, the capacity of United Kingdom policy makers to do so was constrained by a 
distinctive approach to the mechanics of regulation. Carter and Lowe
36
 identify the key 
distinguishing feature of United Kingdom regulatory culture as the prioritisation of 
administrative rather than judicial procedures. Thus, established standard operating 
procedures have tended to be ‘informal, accommodative and technocratic rather than 
formal, confrontational and legalistic …. there has been an avoidance of, indeed a 
distaste for [my emphasis] legislatively prescribed standards and quality objectives …. 
[and] when laws are broken, in the vast majority of cases, officials prefer not to 
prosecute’37. In hindsight, and under pressure from both the Commission and other 
member states, this cosy, opaque and – some would argue – ineffectual approach has 
been supplemented by a more transparent, arms-length and potentially conflictual 
relationship with potential polluters. Nevertheless, the standard-setting philosophies that 
underpin United Kingdom environmental regulation remain artefacts of established 
operating procedures and the discourse of empiricism and problem-solving. As a result, 
the ‘light-touch’ philosophy of Environmental Quality Objectives are preferred to 
prescriptive Uniform Emissions Limits, the pragmatism of Best Practical Means or Best 
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Practical Environmental Option are preferred to Best Available Technology, and 
scientific proof of existing environmental damage is given greater weight than the 
requirement to react to the potential for damage codified in the Precautionary Principle
38
. 
Give the traditional informality of United Kingdom regulatory practices, it is 
paradoxical that the United Kingdom’s recent embrace of new environmental policy 
instruments has not involved an enthusiastic embrace of voluntary agreements. Thus, 
there remain far fewer voluntary agreements in the United Kingdom than in other 
European Union member states and they tend to be (i) concentrated in the sectors of 
agriculture, chemicals, and energy; (ii) non-binding rather than ‘in the shadow of the 
law’; (iii) relatively recent in origin; and (iv) piecemeal and unilateral rather than part of 
wider, long-term commitments. The lack of voluntary agreements even includes a 
reluctance to use eco-labelling, which provides a relatively low cost means of increasing 
the informational resources available to consumers. As Jordan et al observe, ‘one might 
have expected to find many more voluntary agreements in a sector …. that has such a 
long historical tradition of decentralisation, consensus building and negotiation with 
industry’39. On the other hand, one could argue that the traditionally accommodative style 
of environmental regulation in the United Kingdom has served to not only make 
voluntary agreements less necessary but also to undermine the analytical distinction 
between such agreements and regulatory instruments. 
By contrast, and after a slow start, the United Kingdom has become one of the 
leading users of market-based instruments amongst European Union member states. In 
terms of rights-based instruments, two achievements are of note. First, the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs oversaw the setting-up in March 2002, of the 
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United Kingdom Emissions Trading Scheme, in which 33 major companies agreed to 
reduce their emissions over a four-year period by an estimated 11.88 millions tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent. In addition, up to 6000 additional companies subject to 
Climate Change Agreements are able to sign up to the scheme and – if they meet their 
targets – qualify for a reductions in charges from the Climate Change Levy (see below). 
Over the first three years of operation, the department estimates a total of 5.9 million of 
carbon dioxide equivalent was saved through the scheme
40
. The second achievement is 
the United Kingdom’s active role in setting up the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme, which began operation in January 2006. At the time of writing, the European 
Union’s first interim assessment of the scheme had just been released and the United 
Kingdom’s performance under the new scheme was generally regarded as being 
relatively good, although it did exceed its quota and was forced to buy up allowances 
from other member states
41
. 
In addition, to rights-based schemes, the United Kingdom has also been a 
relatively enthusiastic practitioner of eco-taxes. Here, seven examples are of note: the 
1987 unleaded petrol price differential (rescinded in 2001), the 1993 decision to impose 
Value Added Tax on domestic fuel, the 1993 fuel duty escalator, the 1996 Landfill Tax, 
and differential vehicle excise duties according to engine size (at the time of writing, a 
modest sharpening of the differential was recently announced in Chancellor Gordon 
Brown’s 2006 Budget speech), the 2001 Climate Change Levy, and the 2002 Aggregates 
Tax. Despite early resistance to eco-taxes within the United Kingdom environmental 
policy community, such instruments have become attractive, not only because they 
generate revenue for the public purse but also because they have the capacity to 
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permanently change the behaviour of polluters. This is because eco-taxes can capture the 
marginal environmental costs of production and thus tax the externalities of production 
and resource depletion. Unlike regulatory instruments, eco-taxes embed a set of 
incentives that make it rational for firms and individuals to constantly to improve their 
environmental practices. Eco-taxes come with political costs and, as the 2000 Fuel 
Protests demonstrate, their continued success depends on both careful design and political 
calibration over time. Nevertheless, eco-taxes and indeed rights-based mechanisms work 
with the grain of the norms and practices of the United Kingdom’s relatively liberal 
political economy. But as we shall see below, Germany’s social market economy 
provides a less benign environment for either variety of market-based instruments. 
 
Policy instruments and discourses in Germany 
As noted above, the environmental policy community in the Federal Republic remains 
uneasy about the use of market-based instruments. The reasons for this are discussed later 
in this section. Voluntary agreements, on the other hand, are a well-established element in 
the armoury of policy instruments and, unlike the United Kingdom, this includes the 
enthusiastic use of eco-labelling in which Germany – through the use of the ‘Blue Angel’ 
and ‘Green Spot’ schemes - has been a world leader. The widespread use of voluntary 
agreements in tandem with a strongly judicialized regulatory culture makes up a 
distinctly ‘German’ policy mix. 
Between 1972 and 1994, the Federal government enacted eight major pieces of 
environmental legislation. These were: the Waste Disposal Act (1972); the Federal Air 
Quality Protection Act (1974); the Waste Water Charges Act (1976); the Ordinance on 
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Large Combustion Plants (1982/3); the Waste Avoidance Act (1986); the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Act (1991); the Environmental Liability Act (1991); and the Waste 
Management Act (1994). All of these pieces of legislation, as Pehle and Jansen observe, 
are heavily reliant on either traditional command-and-control measures or, in the case of 
the water, waste, and transport sectors, a mixture of command and control plus voluntary 
agreements
42
. 
During the period in office of the 1998-2005 Red-Green coalition, however, 
Germany’s reliance on regulatory instruments was augmented by the use of economic 
instruments. The partial shift in the policy mix is best demonstrated by an examination of 
the instruments used in two main planks of the Red-Green coalition’s environmental 
program during its period in office; first, the phasing out of nuclear power and, second, 
the introduction of an eco-tax. 
The move to phase out nuclear power was a paradigmatic example of Germany’s 
long-established propensity for voluntary agreements made ‘in the shadow of the law’. In 
particular, path-dependency was evident in the use of ‘consensus talks’ with the nuclear 
industry in order to establish a timetable for the closing down of reactors. This was a 
device very similar to the talks on nuclear energy that took place in Lower Saxony during 
the 1990-1994 Red-Green coalition in that state
43
. The eco-tax, by contrast, was 
something of a departure from the standard operating procedures of environmental policy 
making in the Federal Republic. Whereas Germany was an undisputed leader in the use 
of voluntary and regulatory instruments to pursue environmental ends, the forerunners in 
the use of eco-taxes were the Scandinavian countries and, to a lesser extent, the 
Netherlands. Indeed, by the late 1990s, when it came to the use of eco-taxes, Germany 
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had also fallen behind former environmental laggards such as Britain, as already noted, as 
well as France, and Italy
44
. 
Germany’s laggard status in the use of this specific policy instrument is, on the 
one hand, surprising - especially given the potential environmental benefits of such 
instruments. The general benefits of eco-taxes have been described above, but the 
argument in their favour in Germany was augmented by a general perception at the end 
of the 1990s that non-wage labour costs in the Federal Republic were too high. Thus, it 
was argued that a revenue-neutral eco-tax could produce a so-called ‘double dividend’ in 
Germany, because it would serve to both improve environmental practices and, by 
shifting the burden of taxation from labour to emissions and resource use, lower non-
wage labour costs. 
In practice, however, there are a number of reasons why Germany was relatively 
late in adopting eco-taxes as a major tool of environmental policy. First, as already 
discussed, once operating procedures are established it is difficult for institutions to 
transcend them. Thus, for the German environmental policy community, when a new or 
persistent environmental problem is identified, the instinct is to reach for the tried-and-
tested toolkit of existing instruments. In Germany, this tendency was further aggravated 
by the fact that internal and external perceptions of existing policy performance were 
favourable, so there were no major drivers for change in this respect. And by-and-large 
this self-regard was justified, although – as is discussed later in the article – in recent 
years the upward curve of German environmental performance has flattened out. The 
second reason is that, as noted above, eco-taxes go against the grain of some of the 
Federal Republic’s more prized political-economic orthodoxies. No policy instrument is 
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perfect and eco-taxes have been criticized for, for instance, distorting the market, 
carrying substantial implementation, administrative, monitoring, and transaction costs, 
and leading to lower revenues over time as agents adjust their behaviour in response to 
the new market signals
45
. However, the most potent criticism – and one that carried more 
weight in Germany than the United Kingdom – is that eco-taxes are socially regressive 
and inevitably punish the poorest members of society, who spend a greater proportion of 
their household income on energy use. This is consistent with Padgett’s findings that 
demonstrate that in Germany, voters’ preferences on welfare issues significantly restrain 
the use of policy instruments with socially regressive distributionist effects
46
. 
Although not socially regressive in the manner of eco-taxes, a general distaste for 
the instrumentalization of environmental policy can also be detected in the German 
environmental policy community’s resistance to the use of rights-based mechanisms such 
as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. German performance under the new 
scheme has recently been subject to close scrutiny and the German government has been 
criticised for being too generous in its initial allocation of allowances – resulting in its 
running a surplus of allowances and contributing to a fall in the effective price of 
carbon
47
. It remains to be seen if this policy failure was the result of misfit between the 
national and European levels of governance or of a more cynical over-estimation of 
future emissions in order to generate surplus allowances to be traded across the European 
Union (and thus provide windfall profits for German industry). 
 
 
Policy outcomes 
27 
As Jörgens observes, the debate about policy diffusion has tended to focus on the impact 
of policy instruments on outputs
48
. Ultimately, however, the test of the effectiveness of 
policy instruments lies in their impact upon policy outcomes. Yet making outcomes the 
dependant variable in our analysis is no simple task. On the one hand, we can identify 
countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands that have embraced the full array of new 
environmental policy instruments – including market-based instruments – and are 
regarded as environmental leaders. But this does not mean that we can demonstrate with 
confidence that x (use of new environmental policy instruments) leads to y (enhanced 
environmental performance). 
A comparison of the United Kingdom and Germany such as the one in this study 
highlights two specific problems in making outcomes the dependant variable. First, the 
institutional history of the policy sector, and in particular the cumulative impact of 
standard operating procedures and discourses, serves to both constrain the scope of policy 
alternatives and also introduces a degree of complexity that makes a simple causal 
narrative x → y impossible. Second, nation-specific environmental characteristics create 
different incentive structures in the two countries. As Wurzel points out, Germany is 
subject to significantly higher levels of ecological vulnerability than the United Kingdom. 
Germany shares land borders with nine other states, has rivers (such as the Elbe and the 
Rhine) that originate outside its territory and are often slow-flowing, and is a major 
north-south and (since the collapse of communism) east-west transit country. The United 
Kingdom, by contrast, is situated on two North Sea islands, shares one land-border (with 
the Republic of Ireland), has relatively short fast-flowing rivers that originate within the 
territory, and is not a significant transit country (apart from air travel). In addition, the 
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effects of strong winds and what Wurzel calls the ‘scouring sea’ help to disperse air and 
water pollution
49
. These benign environmental characteristics have meant that the United 
Kingdom has been slower to react to the problems of managing the environmental 
commons. The United Kingdom has not been subject to significant trans-boundary 
pollution from its neighbours and over the years became too reliant on the carrying 
capacity of the environment. Thus, environmentally damaging policies such as those of 
‘high chimneys’ and ‘long sea outfalls’ went unchallenged for longer than was practically 
or politically possible in Germany. 
Taken together, these different levels of ecological vulnerability mean that the 
United Kingdom and Germany start from different baselines in terms of both the (real 
and perceived) severity of environmental problems and the incentives to tackle them. Yet, 
some degree of rough comparison between the two countries is still possible. As has been 
discussed earlier in this study, the United Kingdom is not necessarily the environmental 
laggard that it was twenty years ago and in many ways it is ahead of Germany in its use 
of new economic policy instruments, especially market-based instruments. But, unlike 
the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, it still lags behind Germany in terms of 
outcomes. Thus, Germany still has the highest number of low-emission cars in Europe, 
the highest proportional use of lead-free petrol, and retains some of the most stringent 
emission limits. Germany remains a global leader in sewage purification technology, in 
controlling dioxin emissions, and in research and development in the field of renewables. 
Indeed, its capacity for wind-generated electricity now exceeds the United Kingdom’s 
nuclear-generated capacity and it is expected that German photo-voltaic capacity will 
soon do the same. In addition, Germany continues to take an active role in international 
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initiatives
50
, such as the 1992 UNCED Conference in Rio, the Helsinki and Sofia 
protocols on long-range air pollution, the Vienna Agreement and Montreal Protocol on 
protecting the ozone layer, and in forging collaborative strategies with its neighbours to 
protect the North Sea and Baltic
51
. Germany is under pressure from organisations such as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to make more use of 
economic instruments
52
, but this is suggested in order to transcend the ‘law of 
diminishing returns’53 that accompanies policy success rather than as a means to address 
poor environmental performance. 
By contrast, the United Kingdom has embraced market-based instruments but its 
failure to seriously invest in renewables is now beginning to look like a strategic mistake. 
With rising oil and gas prices, diminishing and unpredictable supply, and the practical 
and political constraints on any replacement for the United Kingdom’s ageing nuclear 
plant, it remains to be seen how serious a mistake this really is. What can be deduced 
from the United Kingdom’s relatively poor performance in the field of renewables is that 
agents will react to market signals within the energy market and, in order to foster 
renewables, the signals required must be strong enough to offset short-term incentives 
such as those that underpinned the ‘dash for gas’ in the 1990s. Yet in order to do so, a 
degree of old-fashioned command-and-control regulation is necessary and, in this, 
Germany remains more effective than the United Kingdom in establishing the incentive 
structures that make long-term investment in renewables worthwhile. In short, in the 
United Kingdom there has seen an over-reliance upon market forces and insufficient 
recognition of the consequences of market failure. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that, although there is a long history of British-German 
co-operation in such areas as trade liberalization, defence and security policy, there has 
been very little evidence of co-operation between the two countries in the field of 
environmental policy. If one looks back to the 1980s and early 1990s, this is not 
particularly surprising, given the mismatch between the two countries in terms of both 
environmental performance, the priority given to improving that performance, and indeed 
attitudes to the political arena – the European Union – in which much of this co-operation 
might have taken place. However, the relative absence of overt gestures of co-operation 
in recent years is more intriguing – particularly in the context of the so-called ‘Third 
Way’ and ‘Neue Mitte’ agendas of the late 1990s. Indeed, if one re-reads the Blair-
Schröder paper of July 1999
54
 one is struck by the emphasis on ‘economic dynamism’, 
the ‘unleashing of creativity and innovation’, ‘catching up with the US’ and the 
establishment of a ‘robust and competitive market framework’ rather than environmental 
initiatives. The document does mention the need to pursue a ‘tax policy to promote 
sustainable growth’ by shifting the tax burden from income to consumption, but little 
detail is provided and - given the subsequent ditching of the paper and slow deterioration 
in relations between the two leaders – we shall never know what they might have 
intended in this regard. The replacement of Schröder as Federal Chancellor by Angela 
Merkel in 2005 has led to an improvement in relations between the United Kingdom and 
Germany and this, combined with the slow convergence in policy instruments noted 
above, does open the door for co-operation between the two countries on environmental 
matters in the future. But whether this possible co-operation will serve to facilitate or 
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constrain environmental initiatives at the European Union level is a question best left to 
future research. 
 
 
Conclusions 
This study has examined developments within the environmental policy domain in the 
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany along the dimensions of: (i) the 
historical context; (ii) policy instruments and discourses; and (iii) policy outcomes. In 
addition, it asks if we can we identify patterns of convergence and divergence along these 
three dimensions and to what extent does the European integration process impact upon 
these patterns? In order to answer these questions, let us look at each of the three 
dimensions in turn. 
In terms of the historical context of environmental policy making in the two 
countries, we can see variance in institutional policy performance, the persistence of 
standard operating procedures, and a capacity for learning and adaptation. In the United 
Kingdom, environmental policy making first emerged within the context of the strong 
Victorian unitary state. The operating procedures established in its early phase, with 
central government taking limited measures to empower sub-national levels of 
government to impose uniform, pragmatic, and minimalist standards, persisted well into 
the 20
th
 Century and were only significantly challenged by growing environmental 
competences sited at the European Union level. The intellectual style of policy initiatives, 
from the 1863 Alkali Act through to the 1956 Clean Air Act and beyond, was ‘tactical 
rather than strategic’55 and eschewed the explicit incorporation of abstractions such as 
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Best Available Technology. This tactical approach led to ‘an accretion of agencies, 
procedures and policies’56 in which the key institutional features were those of 
fragmentation and the division of policy competences. Even after the foundation of the 
Department of the Environment in 1970, this fragmentation continued and, since 
Devolution, this pattern has been repeated in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. By 
contrast, German standard operating procedures were grounded in the principle of 
independent Land involvement in the policy sector, with individual Länder enjoying 
powers to enact local ordinances that would become the template for Federal 
legislation
57
, from the Water Household Act of 1957 through the Clean Air Maintenance 
Law of 1959 to the Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants of 1982. As early as the 
1890s, local ordinances enforced corrective measures framed by abstractions such as Best 
Available Technology and this tendency to abstraction has persisted in ideas such as the 
Precautionary Principle. Prior to the involvement of the Federal level, there was a 
significant degree of horizontal co-operation between Länder through the 
Genossenschaften. But even after the involvement of the Federal level, the multi-level 
character of the policy sector persisted. It took until 1986 to set up a Federal Environment 
Ministry and the resulting portfolio still shares competences with rival ministries (such as 
the Economics Ministry) and rival levels of governance. Nevertheless, high levels of 
expert and cross-party consensus at all levels of governance in the late 1980s and early 
1990s provided the platform for significant uploading of environmental policy to the 
European Union level. 
In terms of policy instruments and discourses, the study demonstrates how nation-
specific patterns remain central. Thus, despite some absorption of German-style 
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abstraction, in the United Kingdom we see the persistence of traditions of empiricism and 
problem-solving, as seen in the emphasis upon Environmental Quality Objectives in the 
United Kingdom rather than German-style Uniform Emissions Limits, Best Practical 
Means or Best Practical Environmental Option rather than the wholehearted embrace of 
Best Available Technology, and a reactive approach to existing environmental damage 
rather than a proactive approach to potential threats as codified in the Precautionary 
Principle. 
Finally, as noted in the previous section, we can discern a strong variance in the 
environmental outcomes between the two countries; although, for reasons already 
described, it is of little value trying to ascribe a simplistic causality to the relationship 
between standard operating procedures and outcomes. 
So we have established significant levels of variance across the three dimensions. 
This study, however, has also identified instances of policy diffusion and adaptation, 
particularly by the United Kingdom. For instance, the old light-touch ‘informal, 
accommodative’ style of regulation58 has been replaced by a more transparent, arms-
length and potentially conflictual regulatory style. Moreover, after early resistance to 
market-based instruments, the United Kingdom has become an enthusiastic advocate of 
this type of new environmental policy instruments. Germany, by contrast, has a long 
history of voluntary agreements but has been far more resistant to market-based 
instruments. So, in answer to our first question, although all European Union countries 
have widened their portfolio of policy instruments, one must conclude that there has been 
only limited convergence between the United Kingdom and Germany. This is not to 
argue that there cannot be such a process of convergence and Wurzel
59
, in particular, 
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makes a strong case for the combination of United Kingdom-style pragmatism and 
German abstraction. Nevertheless, at present such a synthesis has not taken place in any 
meaningful way. 
 Paradoxically, one of the reasons for this is found in the development of 
environmental policy competences at the European Union level. As already noted, from 
the mid-1980s the European Union became increasingly assertive in the development of 
environmental policy making. However, although in the early years Germany was 
relatively successful in uploading policy principles to the European Union level, from the 
mid-1990s it increasingly found itself working against the grain of developments at the 
European Union level. By contrast, after an initial period in which the United Kingdom 
was embattled at the European Union level, the level of ‘misfit’60 between United 
Kingdom and European Union policy making has eased. 
It will be recalled that this misfit took place along three dimensions: (i) 
established standard operating procedures directly associated with the policy domain; (ii) 
governance structures; and (iii) political salience and party political competition. And as 
has already been discussed, the strength of adaptional pressures varies across them. In 
terms of standard operating procedures, the shift at the European Union level towards a 
mix of economic instruments and so-called ‘soft law’61 is closer to United Kingdom 
practices and preferences. At the same time, the emergence of multi-level governance 
within the sector has challenged the gatekeeper status of the United Kingdom core 
executive. Finally, in terms of political salience and party political competition, it 
remains to be seen whether the recent (re)emergence of the environment as key concern 
in United Kingdom party political discourse represents a substantive shift by the United 
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Kingdom along this dimension. What is clear, however, is that the shift away from 
command-and-control measures towards market-based instruments – but crucially 
combined with the soft law approach – provides a challenge to our understanding of the 
scope and scale of the processes of Europeanization and policy transfer. In particular, the 
emphasis on misfit as the sine qua non for Europeanization over-emphasises the top-
down effects
62
 of engagement with the European Union. This study has worked from the 
premise that intervening variables such as nation-specific standard operating procedures, 
norms, and discourses really do determine the scope and scale of Europeanization. 
Thus to conclude, it is as much the shift to a soft law approach as it is the 
emphasis on market-based instruments that has determined the shape of environmental 
policy making in the United Kingdom and Germany. Soft law approaches still allow 
policy transfer to take place, but they re-emphasise the role of agency at the national and 
sub-national level. Moreover, this is a development that impacts upon all policy areas in 
which the European Union has enjoyed a shared competence and not just that of 
environmental policy. Given this new emphasis on agency at the member state level, it 
follows that the relatively recent concept of policy resistance
63
 will become an 
increasingly important analytical tool, both in the study of environmental policy, and in 
the study of the Europeanization of policy making more broadly defined. 
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